THE FOURTH CANON

In the twenty-first century, the concept of memory seems redundant. Why do we need to understand memory when we have complex databases, microchips, and advanced electronics that allow us to preserve images, voices, texts of most every event? As for the role of memory in learning, memory again seems a vestige of a previous age. After all, as any student or teacher well knows, we should understand ideas rather than merely memorize them; the days of rote learning are long over. However, our modern day notions of memory shortchange the importance of this field from the beginnings of human civilization. While students today might find the possibilities of learning without a computer dim, most of us would wonder how we could manage without the printed word. However, in times before the developments of writing technologies, most educated people could not read or write. Everything was in one’s head.

I first became interested in the rhetorical aspects of memory when I would joke with my students as we studied the classical canons of rhetoric, saying: the fourth canon is the one people always forget but that is essentially important nonetheless. As I began studying the canon of rhetoric, I realized I was merely stating what many others had said before me in the twentieth century. For example, in 1960, Wayne E. Hoogestraat noted that memory had become the “lost canon,” and argued for its viability in the field of rhetoric. Similarly, in 1993 John Frederick Reynolds published a collected book of essays, *Rhetorical Memory and Delivery*, showing how memory is relevant to the student of rhetoric at the turn of the millennium.

Such an argument would seem necessary, especially with rhetoric textbooks close to ignoring the canon. Edward P.J. Corbett, in his canonical text *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, states that of the five parts of rhetoric, memory is the one that receives the least attention because “not much can be said, in a theoretical way, about the process of memorizing; and after rhetoric came to be concerned mainly with written discourse, there was no further need to deal with memorizing” (27). In the few sentences that Corbett does nod to the classical treatises on memory, he likens them to “courses that one sometimes sees advertised in newspapers or magazines—‘I Can Give You a Retentive Memory in Thirty Days’” (27). When a contributor to Reynolds’ book on memory, Sharon Crowley, co-authored with Debra Hawhee their update of Corbett’s book, she and Hawhee dedicated a chapter to the fourth canon, much more than many other textbooks of rhetoric do. However, even the discussion of this canon in their textbook seems muted in comparison with their discussions of the other canons. Taking up only
Despite this twentieth century dismissiveness, the art of memory is almost as old as the art of rhetoric. Ancient rhetors such as the Sophists, Quintilian, Cicero and the unknown author of Rhetorica Ad Herennium noted memory’s importance to rhetoric. The author of the Dissoi Logoi, one of the earliest known treatises on memory, wrote that memory was “the greatest and fairest discovery [to have] been found…; useful for everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life” (Sprague 292), so useful, in fact, that it was likely one of the subjects taught by the Sophists (Yates 20-31). Memory was the “treasure house” of rhetoric, the “custodian of all the parts of rhetoric” (Ad Herennium 205); it provided the script in one’s head. “What can I say of that repository for all things,” wrote Cicero, “the memory, which, unless it be made the keeper of the matter and words that are the fruits of thought and invention, all the talents of the orator, we see, though they be of the highest degree of excellence, will be of no avail?” (10).

Before the advent of literacy, memory served a purpose in educated society most of us in the twenty-century cannot fathom. Socrates, one of the most revered thinkers of all time, was most likely illiterate, with all his thinking and teaching coming down to us through the writings of others, most notably Plato. All Socrates knew he held in his memory. The students he taught certainly did not take notes with paper and pen, and even if they might have written on boards with chalk or tablets of wax, they would erase ideas only after storing them in their minds. Homer’s Odyssey is said to have been written to facility memory of Greek heritage, with listings of battle gear and coastline details acting a mnemonic devices (See Havelock 11-20). But to remember, students needed to have a method, a means of remembering.

Most frequently connecting memory with sight, classical rhetoricians used the mind’s recollection of visual space to act as a guide to ideas. The poet Simonides is said to have created the art of memory when, after he was the lone survivor at a crowded banquet, he remembered the names of all the corpses by remembering who was sitting where (Cicero 186-187, Quintilian 219-221). According to Quintilian, “[t]his achievement of Simonides appears to have given rise to the observation that it is an assistance to the memory if localities are sharply impressed upon the mind” (221), something Quintilian assures his readers we already subconsciously know:

For when we return to a place after considerable absence, we not merely recognize the place itself, but remember things that we did there, and recall the persons whom we met and even the unuttered thoughts which passed through our minds when we were there before (221).

In all his discussion of memory, Quintilian suggests memory is a more natural than an artificial art. People naturally know how to remember, but repeated practice can help people develop the skill of using visual images to represent ideas, and such images can enhance memory. Cicero too explains how others can take advantage of Simonides’s observation, commenting on how they can create symbols to represent ideas, practicing repeatedly; however, it is the unknown author of Rhetorica Ad Herennium who provides the most detailed explanation of how places should be marked out in order to facilitate remembering. According to this author, a rhetor should use visualized backgrounds or places to mentally create a visual representation of what was to be remembered. Next, the rhetor should put the representation in an imagined place. These places act “like wax tables or papyrus,” and the images like
“the letters” (209). Therefore, a rhetor can simply “read” these images in his or her visual memory in order to remember the speech to be given.

The author warns that care must be taken in the choice of places as well as the representations of what is to be remembered. The order of the places must be carefully arranged, sometimes with images of a hand or a friend named Decimus to remind the rhetor that the background is the fifth or the tenth respectively, so that the rhetor can “read” the images “proceeding in either direction” (211). Similarly, the images should bear likeness to what they represent, either a likeness that is associated with the idea or word or with the sound of the word. And the more stunning and unusual the image, the more likely it is to be remembered. Images should be of “exceptional beauty or singular ugliness”; the images should be dressed “with crowns or purple cloaks”; they could be disfigured, “stained with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint” (221).

The author suggests one striking image to remember a legal charge that a defendant killed a man with poison with a motive of inheritance while there were many witnesses and accessories to the act:

> We shall picture the [defendant] as lying ill in bed… And we shall place the defendant at the bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, and in his left tablet, and on the fourth finger a ram’s testicles. In this way we can record the man who was poisoned, the inheritance, and the witnesses (215).

Interestingly, Aristotle, who codified so much of the rhetorical tradition, had very little to say about memory. In his *Rhetorica*, Aristotle does not mention memory directly at all; however, he does discuss “topos,” which literally means place, at length. According to George Kennedy, the topoi refer “metaphorically [to] that location or space in an art where a speaker can look for ‘available means of persuasion’” (45). Thus, Aristotle may well have been building on common assumptions about how one uses organized “marked out places” to help with memory. To gather information for a speech during the process of invention, one needed to search out these locations to find the necessary and appropriate material (see Crowley 35-39, Small 97-111).

Aristotle does discuss memory explicitly in his short treatise *On Memory*. In this work, Aristotle does not codify elements of memory, but describes. For example, Aristotle notes that memory belongs to the same part of the soul “as that to which imagination belongs” (49). He, like the other theorists of the classical world, comments on how the visual is essential to memory (48), how one must create a kind of visual copy of an original (51). In making a distinction between memory and recollection, Aristotle seems to anticipate Quintilian’s assertion regarding the naturalness of memory. According to Aristotle, a person acquires memory from a “state or affliction” after some time has passed. Recollection, on the other hand, occurs “when he recovers previously held scientific knowledge, or perception (53). This recollection is more artificial; a person who wants to recollect knowledge goes on a kind of “hunt” (54) or a “search in something bodily for an image” (59), a method not so different from the organized search of places advocated by Simonides and the author of the *Ad Herrenium*.

And thus whenever someone wishes to recollect, he will do the following. He will seek to get a starting-point for a change after which will be the change in question. And this is why recollections occur quickest and best from a starting-point. Far as the things are related to each other in succession, so also are the changes. And whatever has some order, as things in mathematics do, is easily remembered ([Cicero] 55).
Even Plato, who so often held sophists and rhetoric in low esteem, felt memory was “the mother of the Muses” (Yates 36). Plato, too, sees memory’s importance as residing in its naturalness, not its artificiality. Condemning the devices and tricks to improve memory that were proposed by some rhetoricians, Plato notes that some people have great skill remembering while others little:

When a person’s mental wax is deep, plentiful, smooth and worked to the right consistency, then whatever enters by means of the senses marks on the ‘heart’... anyway, people whose wax is like that get marks imprinted which are clean and of sufficient depth to last a long time (105, 194c).

Punning on the Greek word for “heart” (ker) and the Greek for “wax” (keros), Plato suggests when one has a good heart, one will remember better (Waterfield 104). On the other hand, those with “unkempt” hearts can more easily forget or get “unclear impressions” (105, 194d). Plato clearly believed that what one remembered became a part of one’s self. If a person did not memorize something, but had to be reminded, then that information was not truly a part of the person. For example, Plato condemns writing since he argues it inhibits memory. In Plato’s dialogue *Phaedrus*, Socrates states that the invention of writing “will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it” (140). The reason it will create forgetfulness is that people will put their “trust in writing, produced by external characters which are not part of themselves” (140). Thus the knowledge will not become a part of the individual. While the ability to read will give people “the appearance of wisdom” (140), true wisdom is achieved when an individual possesses the knowledge in her/his mind and does not need to be reminded of it via “external characters.” One needs to know information by heart.

**MEMORY AFTER THE CLASSICAL PERIOD**

A tradition that is often overlooked in studies of memory is that of Jewish memory. During this classical period, but also in periods before and after it, memory has been an essential element of the Hebrew religion. With the Hebrew Bible frequently giving injunctions for memory (i.e., *Deuteronomy* 6:12), memory was crucial to the Hebrew faith during the same time period that Plato, Aristotle, and unknown authors wrote their texts on memory. So crucial to the Jewish faith was memory, that the faith’s existence depended on it. In other words, not only did the memory of the tradition sustain the religion and allow it to be carried on, but what was remembered was the essence to the belief itself. “If there can be no return to Sinai, then what took place in Sinai must be borne along with the conduits of memory to those who were not there that day” (Yerushalmi 10).

Jewish memory also connected faith and culture, but the memory of culture in the Hebrew tradition has differed markedly from that of other cultures: the Jewish invocation of memory focuses less on the heroic, but on the failures of the Hebrew peoples and on God’s interventions. As Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi writes, “Ironically, many of the biblical narratives seem almost calculated to deflate the national pride. For the real danger [to the Hebrew peoples] is not so much that what happened in the past will be forgotten, as the more crucial aspect of how it happened” (11 emphasis in original).

Thus, memory of God’s goodness becomes a significant part of the Hebrew culture, with prayers, ritual, books, and celebrations working to maintain this memory and giving reason for the memory. The Jewish tradition’s view on memory recognizes, however, the limited nature of human memory. The consistent biblical injunctions to remember recognize that humans are likely to forget; mortals and their
minds are ephemeral while the religion and its Creator are eternal. Thus, the memory of the Hebrews must be maintained by each individual so that the group can carry on what the individual cannot.

In his work on Jewish memory, Yerushalmi observes that much that has been written in the twentieth century on memory does not adequately describe the Jewish tradition of memory, particularly because much is based on the concept that memory sprang from the oral, and, according to Yerushalmi what can be learned from the oral tradition can only be partially applied to “so literate and obstinately bookish a people” (xv). While Plato was condemning the invention in Egypt of writing because it would promote forgetfulness, the Jewish peoples were writing and reading what helped sustain their memory. Because memory was so crucial to this collective identity, understanding the Jewish tradition of memory may help us to understand what scholars of the twentieth century term “collective memory.”

The Christian tradition also recognized the importance of memory. One of the most notable Christian scholars who wrote extensively on memory, St. Augustine in his *Confessions* attempts to explore and know himself in his relationship with his God, asking “how did I come to be what I am now?” (G. Clark 64-65). He recognizes that in the “broad plains and caves and caverns of [his] memory” is his true nature (Augustine 194). Acknowledging the power of the “vast palaces of memory,” similar to those described in classical treatises, that store “innumerable images of all kinds of objects brought in by sense-perception” (185), Augustine describes memory as, what Gary Wills describes as, “a glorified dump” (3). Yet Augustine also explores the nature of memory, showing how it is ever changing, a guide to conduct, and the place of God (Wills 4-26). Most notable, perhaps, is Augustine’s desire to go further than previous understandings of memory to see the relationship between memory and learning, how people come to remember information they previously never knew. He concludes that “by thinking we…gather together ideas which the memory contains in a dispersed and disordered way, and by concentrating our attention we arrange them in order as if ready to hand, stored in the very memory where previously they lay hidden, scattered, and neglected” (189). It is as if, Augustine states, memory is the stomach of the mind, storing information that “cannot be tasted” but can be regurgitated when necessary.

In his attempts to understand memory, Augustine also ventures into the question of time’s essential nature, but finds this concept particularly difficult to grasp because time exists only “in the sense that it tends toward non-existence” (230). Only the present exists, yet both the past and the future can be discerned through signs of them that exist in the present. Concluding that “it is inexact language to speak of three times—past, present, and future,” he suggests “it would be more exact to say: there are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come….The present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation” (235). Thus memory is the keeper of all past.

As such a keeper, memory retained its significance through the Middle Ages even as writing technologies developed. For example, marginalia become a means to remember. One Renaissance text began with the motto:

*Usus libri, non lectio prudentes facit*

[The use, not of reading, or books makes us wise]

First reade, then marke, than practise that is good,

For without vse, we drinke but LETHE flood (qtd Sherman xiii).

Using sacred books to remember them was especially important in the Renaissance because readers wanted to write holy ideas on their souls and hearts, or to know by heart—as Plato had phrased memory
centuries earlier. This recording or recalling to the heart a memory merged with St. Augustine’s idea that memory was the key to an individual’s identity. If someone remembered the Bible chapter and verse, that person was more likely to live out the Bible. Those who could not remember, less likely. Therefore, one needed to internalize texts, to know them “by heart,” not just read them. Training the memory was then a means of building character, piety, and intelligence by making Christian ideas part of the individual (Carruthers 10).

Medieval scholars advised audiences that they could achieve this ambitious end by creating mental grids in which to locate ideas. And like the Rhetorica Ad Herennium which advised its readers to connect fantastic images of ideas with specific places, medieval scholars often recommended that the grids be interspersed with sensational images. Thus, the gridding of the Bible with not only chapter numbers but also verse helped readers to better remember the entire Bible. According to Mary Carruthers, students used the text arranged on the page in columns and rows, with alternating colors, so they could visually remember shorter pieces of the Bible and then put them together. Between various tables were drawings of architectural columns, so that the method of remembering in many ways replicated what the Ad Herrenium had urged (90-96)

In the Enlightenment, the connections among memories, hearts, and identity continued. For example, David Hume wrote that who a person was, his or her very identity was created by what a person knew:

Suppose we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; …. For what is memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like a continuance of one object? In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. (xxxxx)

If we could know what was on a person’s mind, we’d have a clear sense of who that person was. But for a person to be thinking something, that person must be remembering something from his/her past. The more a person remembers a particular past, the more it shapes what the person thinks; therefore, what a person remembers of the past not only helps that person identify what s/he encounters, but also shapes the encounters of the future.

Hume goes on to state that it is only memory that helps us know what we see and feel, only memory that allows us to interpret the world around us; therefore, what we remember very much shapes who we are.

As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ‘tis to be consider’d, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self as a person” (261-262).
If I associate cold with anticipation of cozy evenings by the fire, that association creates my eagerness for the cold. You, who might associate cold with frostbite, might not have that same eagerness. Therefore, this sequence of remembered connections creates who we are.

In the period between the middle ages to the twentieth century, the canon of memory lost its glory (see Hoogestraat). The advent of the industrial age allowed cheap paper, ink and printing to bring literacy to masses that had never before known how to read. The need to remember remained, but lessened. Children still learned literature by recitation up into the beginnings of the twentieth century. For example, my grandfather who grew up on Cape Breton Island in Nova Scotia used to embarrass me with his ability to recite most any poem from the early twentieth century’s canon of literature, and his ability to recite most anything he’d heard only once. Reminiscing about his schoolclasses, he’d tell me about the one book held by the teacher and their homework of memorizing. Pens and books were far too expensive for this rural, farming community. The invention and cheap manufacturing of the ballpoint pen in the early twentieth century is probably one of the least appreciated developments of the modern age. With this tool, students could scribble ideas on paper more freely than with ink from a well, and these scribbled ideas—brainstorming as compositionists called it later in the century—necessitated less of the rumination that was a vestige of memory from the Middle Ages.

MEMORY IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES

In the twentieth century, the canon of memory has become increasingly important. Less focused on how memory aids composition and delivery, early twentieth century scholars of memory began asking more questions about what memory is, how it works, and how it can be preserved. Developments in science, offering physiological understandings of the brain, prompted much of this interest, but another major factor was the Jewish desire for memory. Though the Jewish traditions of memory were marginalized during most of the history of the world, the Jewish desire to remember after the Holocaust inspired much of the interest in the subject of memory.

Before World War II though, the work of philosopher Maurice Halbwachs argued that memory cannot exist in isolation. He illustrated how instead memory is a collective entity created through sharing. Noting the similarities between dreams and memories, Halbwachs argued that dreams fade unless we share them discursively, even if the sharing is silently reviewing the dreams with ourselves. Similarly, our past experiences fade unless we express the memory:

> each impression and each fact...leaves a lasting memory only to the extent that one has thought it over—to the extent that it is connected with the thoughts that come to us from the social milieu. One cannot in fact think about the events of one’s past without discoursing upon them. But to discourse upon something means to connect within a single system of ideas our opinions as well as those of our circle (Halbwachs 53).

We can’t remember unless we share our own representations of the past with ourselves or others through some form of discourse, and this discourse connects our memories with a social framework that helps define them.

To vastly oversimplify Halbwachs’s theories, let me put it this way: if I see a dog with a certain kind of tail pass me, it might pass me without my ever noting the dog again. However, if I tell my children about how the tail had a certain curve to it, I am more likely to remember the dog and the event,
partially because I have discoursed upon the event but also because I connect the idea with my children’s ideas of the dog. Additionally, they might remind me of my memory.

Halbwachs’s theories of the social construct of memory became increasingly important after the rise of the Nazi party throughout Europe, especially because the Nazi party had worked diligently to erase memories of both Jewish history and what the party did to create this erasure. With Jewish peoples and their memories destroyed, graveyards with traces of these memories demolished, and German histories rewritten, post-World War II scholars wondered how anyone could know what had happened in the past. The ironic consequence is that “the universal valorization of memory and of the memory of Auschwitz, Jewish tradition now exerts a strong influence in a world in which that tradition was very nearly erased” (Rousso 18, Yerushalmi). The work of non-Jewish Halbwachs, but still victim to the Holocaust, became a reference point regarding collective memory as numerous scholars struggled with the desire to remember the atrocities committed on millions of innocent people, the longing to forget and move past horrors of the past, and the threatening knowledge that memory can only exist in representation and representation is never exact.iv

Numerous other events in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century have furthered the examinations of memory. September 11th, the fall of the Soviet Union, and atrocities in Africa and Eastern Europe, the struggle for power Middle East are only a few of the events that have led to similar discussions regarding memory. Henry Rousso wrote in 1998 that memory has become a “media buzzword,” springing up everywhere (2); the same is certainly true more than a decade later.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Within these discussions of memory, the terms “public” and “collective” memory have emerged, and what these terms mean often becomes confusing; as James Wertsche has observed, “even when speakers assume they have one meaning in mind [regarding collective memory], this meaning often turns out to be fuzzy and not clearly differentiated from others” (5). At the same time, some question whether such a body of public or collective beliefs about the past really does exist.

Scholars continue using the terms collective and public memories without clearly differentiating between the two, or arguing for a difference. Most scholars do agree that collective memory cannot be understood without reference to individual memory (Rousso 6), but certainly not that collective memory is one memory in one brain shared by many individuals. They also seem to agree that though realities of the past are socially constructed, “the process is not a discursive free-for-all” (Irwin-Zarecka 17). Yet the confusion in terms continues.

For example, in 1992 LeGoff defined collective memory as a kind of ethnic memory, yet in 2001 Edward Casey, in an attempt to clarify terms, defined what LeGoff termed collective memories (those held in common by people with both shared experiences and ties to each other) social memories. Casey further defined collective memories as memories of the same event held by people who do not necessarily know each other (“where were you when you heard about the event of September 11th?) and public as memory that is “out in the open, …where discussion with others is possible—whether on the basis of chance encounters or planned meetings—but also where one is exposed and vulnerable, where one’s limitations and fallibilities are all too apparent” (25). However, John Bodner’s 1992 understanding of public memory is very different from Casey’s. While Bodner, like Casey, sees public memory as “out in the open” or, as Bodner puts it, “fashioned ideally in a public sphere in which various parts of the social structure exchange views” (15), Bodner does not see such memory as exposing limitations and fallibilities. Instead, he argues public memory helps
society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future,…[it] adds perspective and *authenticity* to the views articulated in this exchange; defenders of official and vernacular interests are selectively retrieved from the past to perform similar functions in the present (15, emphasis added).

Instead of projecting vulnerability, this public memory projects authenticity.

In a wonderful 1995 overview of work on memory studies, Barbie Zelizer also commented on the problems of understanding the various terms used to describe collective memory, and again in 1998 as she examined the role of images in collective memory. In her 1998 book, Zelizer comments that material, visual collective memory is usable by a group of people, “facilitating cultural, social, economic, and political connections, establishing social order and determining belonging, exclusivity, solidarity and continuity” (Remembering 4). Objects such as wedding rings or yellow, pink, white or red ribbon as well as images “help stabilize and anchor collective memory’s transient and fluctuating nature…to the extent that images often become an event’s primary markers” (6) which then direct people to remember in a certain way.

Perhaps it is best to understand collective memory by first following Iwona Irwin-Zareck’s directive to see such memory as “best located not in the minds of individuals, but in the resources they share” (4), or by accepting what James Wertsch terms a fish scale knowledge system, partial overlap of individual memories that form a kind of pattern. This “fish scale” memory suggests that there is not a single collective memory, but a generally similar idea of the past shared by many groups of people.

While each person remembers the past differently in her or his individual mind, the marker or resource as the basis of individual memories causes many similarities in what each individual remembers. Additionally, the shared resources that create collective memory do not create one collective memory but numerous collective memories; the overlapping is far from even or regular. Nevertheless overlap exists because the physicality of what the memory is based on is shared. Place and memorials allow people who never experienced the initial event or person that is memorialized to perform the event or to transport themselves to the event or person. Those who never knew what is remembered can therefore put together the fragments of material, to remember them.

In focusing on memories of the past shared by groups of people because of their shared resources, I suggest avoidance of the term “public.” From the work of such scholars as John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, Gerard Hauser, Jurgen Habermas, and Alan Gross, I think I can deduce that a public is a collective, but a collective is not necessarily a public: the distinction between something public and non-public can be very murky. For example, most citizens do not have the means to supply money for a monument to be erected in a city owned park. When one private donor convinces a city that a monument should be in this park, is the memory the monument creates public? Sometimes the resources of the places are open to all, sometimes they are not. Often they can be viewed by all, but not created by all. Sometimes it is not clear whether or not a place is public.

Additionally, the concept of public is always associated with power. Bodner’s understanding of public memory explicitly acknowledges this association, and his referencing of both “official” and “vernacular” memories nods toward the fact that some memories have resources behind them and others do not. Bodner argues that there is a continual negotiation between these two types of memory, yet the negotiation is far from even. As the work of Milan Kundara and other writers of the former Soviet Union observe, what is official is rarely believed by the people, but the negotiation of memory often happens in private, not any place that would ever be considered public.
Rhetoric and memory have had a long relationship. New disciplines have begun to claim memory as their own in recent years, but as puzzles over collective memory reveal, rhetoric and memory still have a great future ahead of them.

1 Although Harry Caplan in the Loeb Classical Library edition translates loco as background, Jocelyn Penny Small suggests place is a much better translation of the word, better reflecting the thinking behind the author’s use of memory places (98). In this discussion, I use Small’s suggested preferred term “place.”

ii See Carruthers 63 regarding the possibility that Aristotle wrote other works on memory.

iii According to Carruthers, this concept of regurgitating memory was dominant in the Middle Ages. One needed to remember various texts so one would Mull them over before beginning a new text. Carruthers illustrates that our modern day concept of rumination comes from the idea of digesting ideas, remembering, thinking them over, before expulsing a new text.

iv For example, Saul Friedlander notes that the Holocaust challenges our memories, because nothing like it had previously existed, so conventional means of remembering didn’t work. James Young has written on how the rhetorical nature of memory can diminish it. While many, such as Eli Weisel lived to tell their stories, there was a concern that “the essential rhetoricity” involved in writing their memories that would appear to fictionalize the very real events of the past (23). Alan Gross has written about recent museum representations of the Holocaust with information foregrounded and backgrounded that seems to encourage amnesia. Not using the terms foreground and background, Sarah Farmer examines the commemorative debates over Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s “double history”; people argue whether to remember a location’s genocide of Jewish people or of the subsequent abuse of Germans by the Soviets. Also considering more recent repercussions of the Holocaust on memory, Barbie Zelizer has critiqued the visual representations of the twentieth century’s many genocides, arguing that the horror has been lessened with repeated reference and representation and witness to atrocity no longer compels responsibility, citing Yael ILZerubavel and Bernice Barnett. “The Recovery of Masade: A Study in Collective Memory” Sociology Quarterly 27 (1986): 147-164.

v This “fishscale memory” is also termed complimentary distributed collective memory, a concept that has general acceptance among scholars (Wertsch 23).

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